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Introduction
I t is the boast of hirtorl cn"> w.p.t.eri^ i PW ?. hs*- th?
prerent IF bent unrl err toed in Hp-tit of ivhrt h.^s taker
plp.ee i!^  the pest. The future too is ^on?.it3ererl to be s
lopiral product of what, h*!? b"rr*enec! to !:oth the T'sst snrl
the present. I t is against thi<? bKekrrOiin'i that thir>
seek? to explain some pr>n* emporni"1 ^robi eirp of
rncy in Kj freriH in l i rht of tbe nptior'r rr°-ro1 oni s!l
pud coloniR) anteredents. The motley of isruer- to be
examined here will include the nature of the Nirerian
society in the precolonisl period; the extent to which one
could consider the political system in the pre-color.ial
hirerian kinrdoms, empires and states to be democratic; the
process through which colonial rule was established and
implemented in Nigeria; whether or not the colonial masters
who introduced Mgerie to western democracy professed to be
democrats themselves. These and many other issue? will be
dialectlcally exsmined with a view to explaining why thlnrs
sre the way they are in Nigeria today.
Pre-colonlal institutions
before the British beran to pursue a colonial policy
in the country during the ineteenth century, the ceorrra-
phical expression now known as Kiferia was made up of a
multiplicity of independent, kinr-rioms and en-oire? ep.c.h of
which hBd complex political systems sufficient for the
needs of the neoTile. There was the great Knnem-Bornu
empire; the Hausa states; the old kingdoms of Qyo, Ife
and Benin; the Jukun, Nupe and I gala kingdoms; the
decentralised IP!;O speaking polities and many others.
Rather than attempting the dispensable task of
examining the socio-political set-up of all the kingdoms,
empires and states discussed above to determine their
democratic content, the present effort ahall be essen-
tially limited to the Hausa states, Yoruba kingdoms and
the segmentary Ibo society. The political framework of
the other states could therefore be used as related
examples where found necessary as these three major groups
had such political characteristics easily comparable to .
the ones developed by the other states. For example, the
political 3ystem in Hausaland at the-dawn of the Nlcrerian
colonialism could be found in virtuelly all PBrts of
northern Nigeria, flown to Ilorin In yorubaland. The rioli-
tlcnl system in ?oru!;aland durinp same period was ^oaely
in mopt of t*p kingdoms. The Irto-srenkinr people
niRO »;een noted .not to he isolated in t.he\r rrnctlr;*;
of n»>r>ment.nr*'r nn"H tier! ^v?+emi The Tiv 'sni o^mp "oorle
from th^ Mfer ^eltT ="Ra practised the samft svsterr of
administration.
3Politically, the ndminiptrntior. of the H i^sf; s^Dter.
in the r-re-colonia] ern centre RrourM thr ^er^nO 1 ty of
the aarki '.'.-ho derived the 1 «"i timp<-;r to Hs rentier;!
newer by royal descent. For t^e ijark: to maintain an
effective control of his people, however, he hed to ae^ena
upon a feudal evptein in which he mobilised r. Isrfe army of
supporters to serve his personal interests in return for
material and political rewards. The most important of the
king's supporters were usually the fiefholding officials
most of v/hom derived th.eir chieftaincy t i t les throng feudal
relationship with the aarki. In some esses, some members of
the exclusive royal linearre colled Yan Sarki were also
appointed as fiefholders. These officials served as the
agents of the Sarkl in revenue collections and peneral
administration, most especially in wealth producing t e r r i -
tories. To this end, political power in most Kause states
was usuHlly a product of functional balance between the
interests of the Sarkl and his fiefholders who of course
were trusted members of the society, as far as the assess-
ment of the Kine could go.
The hausa political systerc around this time recop-nised
the sharp division of the society into two major classes -
the rulers fniaau saranta) enci the subjects (talaKev/a).-
But fo" the feudal system that made it possible for B
ts3.akav.ra to be rewarded with a fiefholding office throug-h
hiE military prowess or other social achievements, it, would
have been impossible for a subject to enter the ruling
class ir view of the limited number of people that could
clein; royal descent in the states. l
?h<= Sokoto Jihad which took place between 1801J and
1809 established Islamic religion as a new source of poli-
tick po-.vsr tn Hausaland. So much was this that the pre-
existing Habe rulers were replaced by the Islam professing-
iur.irs. 7.1th the defeat of such Hausa states as Kano,
hazaure, Zaria, Katsina, Daura, Gobir, Zamfara and many
others by the Jinadists led by Uaman Dan Podio, the Kausa
rulers who now had to operate under a colonial system
headed by the Caliph In Sokoto could no longer operate as
the supreme commanders of their territories as did in the
pre-jihad years. 'What moret the vassal states formerly
under the Habe rulers now found new freedom in the Cali-
phate system under which their lost independence became
regained. Under the new arrangement, the Bnirs were
expected to acknowledge the authority of the Caliph, the
head of the Sokoto Caliphate. Though the Caliph allowed
the Emire to exercise a high depree of autonomy at
administering their territories!, tliere were certain
occasions when the Cnliph through his lieutennnts ha:i to
intervene in the affairs of some territories by brintrinc
erring jjr.irs to order, especially when the issue concerned
hao to ao with the violation of the establisped islanie
principles of government in the Caliphate. The Caliph had
the unchallengeable ana unchallenged power to appoint, and
dismiss Junirs.
All the emirs were expected to visit Sokoto froir time
to time as a sign of allegiance to the Caliph. They were
expected to pay annual tributes to him. In return, the
Emirates looked unto Sokoto for military support in time of
wars. The Cnliph was held in high esteem as the "Supreme
Judge of the Shoria". Though the Caliphate system retained
certain HBUSB institutions, the Emirs were expected to rule
according to the islamic law.
The observation has however been made that though the
Bnirs in the post-Jihad era were under the Caliph in Sokoto,
the Caliphate system conrered on them a greater power than
their predecessors the habe aarkis) enjoyed in the pre-jihad
years. According to Abdullahi mahadi,
The Jihad movements in Kano and elsewhere
in Hausaland was e typical example of a
revolution without transformation of the
pre-existing structures of the social
system. What the Jama'a succeeded in
doing was the removal of the rulers
from power leaving intact the very well
established stBte structures and ins t i -
tutions which the new rulers simply
accommodated and even enlarged. The
control of the major means of production,
namely, land and labour by the Sarauta
Ftite was more than ever before repred
towards satisfying the material comfort
of the rulers and greed of the bir»
a t tn i i ra i , two frroups in the society whose
interests were increasingly becoming inter-
twined. In the process the other members
of the society were rele??sted to the
position of mere supporters of the privi-
leged proups.fi
When carefully considered, i t would therefore be di scored,
that the Jihr.d was a far-cry away from the needs of the
common man, the talakav?a, in the affected areas. The
in the emirates could not have been much affected
by the colonial relationship between the Caliph and the
ijnirs but for the islaniic education v/hich now started
becoming widespread away from the courtyards where i t was
earlier confined by the Habe rulers. More than anything
else, the Jihad helped to weld Hausaland and the other
polities under the Caliphate system (the present day
northern Kigeria) together-
Like the Sarki in Hausaland, the Oba in the pre-
colonial Yorubeland exercised a far-reaching political
influence !;ut under a monarchical system of croveminent.
The Qba wonted in concert with some state officials as
Oyomssi in Oyo, the Olori iv.aru in />.no-tjtiti , the i^ -nene
in Hesa etc. The tforubo Kings (Oba; wnose traditional
t i t l e s varied from one kinc-aom to the other were divine
rulers. The kin? was seen as alase eke.ji oris- (the
second in command to the rods). The extent of the Obs's
power is s t i l l testified to by the Yorubs maxim: enl b".
f'oriu d'obg av/owo a wo (he who tr ies to under-rate a kinp
vfould be crushed in the process). The Qba was assisted
either directly or indirectly in administration My Ifa
oracle diviners (Babaiav.'Q or A-JJOPO in some plf.ee?) arid
members of the Orboni society.
The pre-colonlal Yoruba people had a relatively
centralised political system in which the £ba had political
representatives in the villages and vassal states. Such a
representative is t i t led 3gale, Aso.iuoba. A.i ele etc depend-
ing on the affected kingdom, he charged and collected
taxesi tolls and tributes on behalf of his principla Qba.
Within each of the kingdoms, the Qba was assisted in
administration by supporting chiefs representing various
interests in the state. The council of state was made up
of chieftains representing the royal interests, commoners1
interest as well as religious interests. In most of the
8the political system vine designed in such a
manner that both the Qba and his chiefs had specific
constitutional roles to play in the administrati on of the
state. Most, especially In the Old Qypf the Qha could not
exercise any totalitarian or t.vranic power in the state
a? there were various constitutional methods of preventing
such. For example, the Qyp Me si who were reeoe-nieed as
the "watch dogs1' of the people's liberty in the Old Oyo
empire could depose a tyrannical Icin^ and thereby force him
to commit suicide. This right was exercised on various
occasions during the 17th and 18th centuries to the extent
that its .ibused usage contributed in no smell measure to
the eventual fall of the Qyo empire.
Despotism in the pre-colonial Yoruba kingdoms was also
checked through some divine limitations on the po.wer of the
Qba. According to Akinjogbin and Ayandele, such limita-
tions called eev.'O (taboos) which varied from one Yoruba
kingdom to the other were usually recounted to the Qba as
part of the initiation ceremonies into the kingship. A
violation of the eewo by the Qb° was usually visited with
heavy penaDties- It could lead to his deposition. The
l«?rper society also had various eewo. s violation of v/hich
could invoke the annoyance or the gods on the entire society
or the particularly concerned "erson.
The Oyo empire f>11 due to internal rtirr-.«ni;ionp ".nd
to the pressure mounted by the SokPt.o ,ii h-adir-tr froir
Ilorin in the 1830s. The leadership vacuum created in
Yoru'jalana by the fall of Oyo served as r. catalyst to a
large scale warfare that characterised the 19'th century
lTorubalarid. "" kany of the states wanted 10 occupy the
leadership position vacated by Oyo. Promiment among the
warring- /oruba states were Ibadan, Ijaye and Abeokuta.
With the completion or these different wars which tilted
the balance of power away from Oyo towards the above
mentioned states, especially Ibadan and Ijayei the politi-
cal organization or some Yorube states became chanped.
Both Ibadan and Ijaye mho had now become the military power
in Yorubaland rejected the monarchical Jcin^ of government
that was popular among the Yoruba people. They established
a new political system based on military achievements. '
Despite all these chances in the power base of the
Oba. Ajayi and Akintoye have noted that the degree of
influence that the kings still had on the people never
changed. The people still saw them as representatives of
the gods. As B result of the general insecurity that the
19th century wars in Yorubaland generated, the common man
men in view of their threatened personal liberty had to
submit themselves to the whims and caprices of the leading
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warriors to buy dignity and security for themselves.
The new leaders in these new states, especially Ibodan
also got rid of the Old Oyo preetice whereby the powers
of the Oba was curtailed by certain palace offieiHls such
ar- Cyomcsl* The traditionsl ruler simply became more
autowatic.
The third major kln^ of political experience in the
pre-colonial Ki.ceria was the seomentery system of roverr-
ment practised by the Igbo, lbibia, Tiv and other politi-
cally decentralised people ir the Miperian society. These
people hsd no elaborate stete system or kingdoms comparable
to those of the hause and iforuba people. Here, village
groups constituted the political units. Kather than
practising a system whereby political powers were concen-
trated ir. the hands of an aristocratic group, the Igbo for
example had an elaborate age-grade system that made for
gerontocretlc rule. This provided for a constitutionally
established demarcation between the socio-political func-
tions of the elders and young adults. Describing the
structure of this society, Robin Horton noted that:
... young adults are responsible for the
cctual labour in public works, for the
brunt of active operations in war; for
the expression of dissatisfaction about
the state of village life: for the conti-
r;ur-r^ estions of nolutionp to vilDsre
'les; and for- ptartinr most quarrels.
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ildera, on the other hand, are artvirer; or
the conduct of war; moderators havir;.- the
last word ir village effairr renerfiijy; and
settlers of the quarrels provoked by the
young. In the villape assembly, tVie t-.vo
croups sit opposite one another; ar.;. for the
western observer familiar with parliamentary
institutions, their behsviour is superfi-
cially remir.i scent, of that of "rov eminent"
and "opposition" in aebstes . . . both ure well
aware of their mutual indispensability . . .
the matter at issue tend= to be tossed beck
and forth until s. compromise is reecr.ed upon
v.hich both can arree.16
Under this egalitarian political structure, the elders
snd. s headman constitute/the pollticel authority in each
village. They ufcn. indirectly helped in administration by
members of some secret societies who performed veiled
executive and judicial functions in the society. These
secret societies whose membership was made open to nil
mature and trustworthy members of the society, settled
cumbersome inter-vlllaere feuds. All deliberations and
execution of the societies1 decisions were usually kept
secret to preclude any undue interference or influence
from memhers of the public. The secret societies
ensured that sectional interests were not allowed to
overshadow equalitarian justice v^ithin the communities.
Oral traditions in Igbolnnd and archaeological
evidence froir lrbo-Ukwu hsve shown that the earliest
centralised politics! authority known in the pre-colonial
Irtolnnr war that of p.ze Nrl, the spiritual "kinp of the
Urmeri clon of the Ieto". Though the Eze Krl did not
'.vield the kind of political influence arrogated to the
Yoruba Qba and the Kauaa SBrki, he however commanded such
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morel one spiritual respect amonrf the people, to the
extent that the TLze: Krl is best presented as an authorita-
rian in Irbo literature. The influence of Kri PTdduelly
spread to the other parts of Ipboland until i t was rivaled
in the 16th and l<(th centuries by the oracle-based institu-
T n
tions of the Arochukwu people. For the first time in the
history of political development in lgboland, the /,ro people
and their oracles provided a political-cum-economic system
under which a violation of the societal ideals by the people
WBS punished by enslavement or death. The militarist posture
of the Arochukwu made the people to recognise and feel the
impact of the "centralising" authority. The influence of
the oracle spread ao far as the l?iger Delta and i ts hinter-
lBnd. The Arochukwu priests and oracles had to be totally
dislodged by the invading British forces on 2kth December,
1901 before British influence could be firmly established
in Eastern Nigeria.
Comparative Ana3.yaia of the Po i i t i n l Systeirs
A comparative study of the =ocio-political institu-
tions in pre-colonial Hauaef Yoruba. I?bo and other Nigerian
societies readily show that the rulers of these places
derived their political powers from popular customs and
traditions. The right to rule was restricted only to the
generally-acknowledged aristocratic class. Except in Igbo-
land and some other segmentary societies, the kings were
appointed from the ruling aristocratic lineages. One could
argue here therefore that the Oba and Sarki derived the
legitimacy to their office by the generally acknowledged
customs of the people. To this lenirth, their rights to
office could be said ta be democratic. This is a democracy
of general consent, if not clinically subjected to the
litmus test of the modern-day parameters of democratic
•principles.
In the use of their political rower, however, the Qba.
Sarkl, Caliph have h,p*n found to !^ e nntv'orit.,TriiF!'".r. Thour-h
in most of the kinc"SoT:s institutional, machinery existed to
curtail the power of the rulers,' most, of these ki.nrs s t i l l
orreared no less than absolute rulers whose orders could
hardly be challenged. Host of them personalised political
power to such an extent that their subjects look unto than
lit
as infallible pods. The modern-day requirement of
"freedom of eveech", "freedom of movement," "freedom of
conscience" and the democratic "fundamental human rifhts"
cculd not hsve meant much to any of them. In Yorutfiland,
the people addressed the Qbe. as Kabivesi (we dare not
question him). The Hausas Sgrki was aial duniyan (the
owner of the v/orld) or Zakl (lion). It WBE only in Igbo-
lend that the people saw their traditional rulers as mere
human beinps. Even then, this must have excluded the
Arochukwu priests, who could sentence one to slavery or
death at will. The Yoruba Oba could forcefully marry any
pirl that pleased him, levy any amount of tax or tribute
and unilaterally dismiss any of his chiefs. The picture
in the old northern Nigeria was similar. Accordinr to the
reports of al-Mullallabi about the Mais of Borno {a situa-
tion applicable to most parts of northern Nigeria " . . . the
people exhalt and worship (the king) instead of God . . .
and believing that i t is (the king) who bring l i fe and
21death, sickness and health". Even in the post-Jihad
, the jjnirs as the sole agents of the Amir-'al
fau'niunln (commander of the faithfuls) in the emirates could
only be said to have wielded higher political power than
the iiabe rulers. Therefore, except in Igboland where
16
decision-makinr were usue1!;' made a product of open debates,
the ordinary man under the pre-colonial r.itu&'.ion, co';:c
herdly have been qualified to challenge nny king or i">ise a
dia3enti.i£ voice against hin.
Vrobably the only inimt that the cor.mon nu.r. m^ae tc
dec i si on-making; during the period under reviev.' was the
constitutional checks exercised by the chiefs in certain
parts of the country against their monarchs. In the Old
Oyo empire the Oyomeai could constitutionally dethrone a
despotic Alaafin or force him to commit suicide. In the
Benin kingdom, the I.yaae {the senior town chiefs) could
2?
publicly oppose an Oba. and the Uzpma could also exercise
some ritual influence that could serve as a check oh the
king; in I gala kingdoms, the Igalamela shared political
power with the king. J Professor Atsnde has argued that
the checks exercised by these chiefs against their kiners
could be interpreted to be the collective checks of the
people on the monarchs. This is based on the premise that
the chiefs by nature of their appointments were represen-
tatives of different "linea.srer, a^e-grade sets and titled
societies that formed the fabric of the society."
Plausible as this argument seems, it fails to take into
deep consideration the fact that the constitutional checks
17
or the chiefs on the monsrchs cannot be strong enough to
displace the voice of the individual which democracy seeks
to protect. But despite all these checks, the fact remains
that the kings were still symbols of the established order
under which the legislative, executive and judicial powers
ot the state were combined in the hands of single indivi-
duals'
It is instructive to state that the authoritarian
Influence of these rulers derived from the cosmologleal
beliefs of the people. This easily made them to be pliant
subjects of authoritarians themselves.
The social stratification of most these societies was
such that the priests, kings and elders were believed to
have the final say in any matter of state concern As every-
body aspired to also become old and consequently attain the
status of an elder, he made efforts to recognise the words
of elders as laws. The family was headed by a ITIBIB head
who unilaterally dictated how things should be none to
members of his household. He was answerable to nobotty for
the action taKen within his family, women were regarded
as minors and GO v/ere only seen but not heard. They played-
little or no roles in 4ecision-maKing. The entire communi-
ties visaed the Kinp ng the father of ^11 and the worldly
18
representative of the gods. This concept, of pnternal
and personalised Authority prevented i larr-c "ection of
the people from opposing whatever the traditional heed
of their environments did or said. This has been partly
responsible for the political aparty and docility of a
large section of Nigerians which President Babantfida's
Directorate of Mass Mobilization (KAMSERj tried to address
to no success some three decades after the nation13
independence.
The failure of MAMSER consisted largely in the non-
commital of the Babnngida administration to any dramatic
social change. The regime promoted lsrge scale social,
economic and political corruption. It aoon collapsed on
27th August, 1993 amidst its too many contradictions. The
new military regime in Nigeria headed by General Sani
Abac ha is a more confused one that the ones that preceded
it. It lacks any sense of direction and relies only on
the use of force,.cjfix«.i> a*«l'rftt"1-1" (**!«• ton •
Commenting generally on the level or ignorance, super-
atition and fear of the unknown that characterised the ire-
colonial Niperian society, Chief Qbofemi .4wolc-'«o once noted
that:
... the myths created by the dominant
rroup enjoyed indubitable credibility,
m i were accorded unquestin^ and
unreflectinp obeisance in all things,
and at all times. It would appeal" that
the more awesome and more gruesome the
demands of the gods and spirits, through
the priests, and the more arbitrary the
dictates and ordinances, of the Icings
were, the swifter and moreddevotect the
people were in their response and
obedience.25
The contemporary experience in Nigeria is not different
froni the picture painted by Awolowo in the above quotation.
Western Democracy and the British Colonial Interests In
Mreria
Western democracy was introduced to Nigeria through
the colonial relationship between the country and Britain.
Yet, tD relate the idea of democracy with colonialism is
another exercise in non seoultor as the two stand in sharp
contrast to the other, '"hile democracy is more interested
in mskinr it possible for the citizen to o-overn himself,
colonial rule is stinted towards the protection of the
narrow anci selfish interests of the colonial master. '.Vhet
more, colonialism is often established through the use of
force. The most important question in the political deve-
loument of Kip-eria is how could Britain, a colonial interest
have been able to Impart democratic culture on Mgeriens.
Yet, the fact remains that Nigerians could not have learnt
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about the western ides of democracy but from itr erstwhile
colonial master - the British.
The colonization oi1 Mperia by Britain cnn be dsted
back to the early 19th century when the British who had
Ion? been competing with the other European merchant* aloruj
the coastal states of KiceriH bepan to show interest in the
political control of Leeds. A dynastic feud between Akintoye
and KosoKo provide the British with enough excuse in lfi^ l to
intervene in the political affairs or LBPOS. For the support
riven him against his opponent, Akintoye in 1651 was lured
into signing a document which placed the entire Lagos under
the British "protectorship". In 1861, the British annexed
Lagos under Dosumu, a new ruler or Lagos. In 16tJ5« the area
became known as the Colony and Protectorate or LagOB with
another 3igned treaty with the Alaafin of Oyo which placed
forubaland under the British protection. During the Bame
year, a protectorate of Oil Rivers which was later expanded
in 1893 as Niger Coast Protectorate was formed. The coloni-
zation of northern Kigeria was through a long proceee of
commercial activities. When it became clear that colonial
rule could not be established here by peaceful means, Lord
Lusrard had to resort to military expeditions especially
against Rokoto and Gwandu which were the Islamic power
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base or northern Nigerians. Therefore, the Sokoto army
was defeated by the 3ritish on Jjth March, 1903. A nev;
Caliph was appointed to replace Attahiru Ahraadu who had
earlier fled but was later arrested and killed.
During the short but historical installation of the
new Caliph, Muhamir.adu Attahiru (1903-15), Lord Lugard
unilaterally announced the demise of the sokoto Caliphate
and the birth of the British hegemony in northern Nigeria;
The old treaties are dead, you have killed
them.' Now these are the words which I , the
High Commissioner have to say for the
future. The Pulani in old times under Dan
Podlo conquered this country. They took
the right to rule over i t , to levy taxes,
to depose kings and to create kinps- They
in turn have by defeat lost their rule which
has come into the hands of the British. All
these things which I have said the Pulani by
conquest the right to do now pass to the
British. Every Sultan or Emir and the
principal officers of state will be appointed
by the Hioti Commissioner throughout all the
country. ?"?
By the time Lord LursM finished with the North, it became
obvious that si] the imperial exploits of the Caliph and
the northern Jirr.irs were now subservient to the political
dictatorship of the British. Then Lurard turned his
attention tack to Southern Nigeria.
In 1906, Lord Luijrirri created the Colony and Protec-
torate of southern Mgerla. On January 1» 191'i t he
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.^ the Colony anfi Protectorate of Southern Kireria.
On January l , lgiti, he almesrsmRted the Colony and Protec-
torate of Southern Nip-erie with that of the North riving
hirth to the Colony and Protectorate of Fireria. Lori Lurnrd
thus becsme the first Governor General of the country.
As evident in the fo^e^oinr exposition, the British
concentrated most on the nu!.\1ur-Fitior: or the Ni peri en kinps
and chiefs rather than the people. This was based or. the
tt-ous-ht that once a kinp (highly revered by the people) was
conquered, his subjects would easily realise the political
strength and wisdom of the conquerors. This greatly helped
the British invaders, iiven after the conquest of the entire
country, the British s t i l l aaed the traditional rulers to
control the people under the 'indirect Rule1 policy. The
summary of this political system was published in 1920 In
Lupard's "Almagamation Report".
The system . . . had been based on the
authority of the Native chiefs. The
policy of the government was that thg
chiefs, should govern their people, not
as independent but dependent Rulers . . .
The taxes are raised in the name of the
native ruler end by his spents, but he
surrenders the fixea proportion to
Government, and thf erpenditure of the
portion assigned t,c thf Native Admini-
stration, from which fixed salaries to
to BII Native officinls ere paid, is
subject to the advice of the Resident.,
anrl the ultimate control of the Governor.26
(emphasis mine)
To e large extent, the indirect rule system r/as
to meet the selfish enus of the colonial masters. It also
had little to do with the general interests of the people.
In view of how the riritish colonial rule was established
in Meerie and the administrative policy of the colonial
master, Professor Dudley hae argued that a colonial rule is a
military rule and therefore cannot be democratic. According
to him, "whatever legitimacy, if one could talk of legitimacy
ir. such a context, the colonial authorities possessed derived
not from any set of agreed rules, but from the monopoly of
the means of violence". The level of military and para-
military violence of the British against the IJebu people,
Arochukwu priests and traders and some Emirs in the Sokoto
Caliphate probably suffice to support Dudley's thesis. The
argument is better appreciated in the wordB of Lord Lupard
himself:
Whatever happens we have got the
maxim guns and they have not.30
Just as the channels through vfhich British rule was
established over Nigeria could be said to be undemocratic,
the administrative policy adopted by the regime was Itself
an abUBe of democratic processes. It is in fact respon-
sible for some of the problems of democratic politics
currently faced in Mperia. The British policy of Indirect
Rule was not uniformly implemented in the country. The
system is responsible for' the current Korth-South dichotomy
in the country. Under the indirect rule, the powers of the
Barkis and Ohas were increased as they now had the backing
of the colonial master? for their actions. In Yorubfilnnd
for exanple. the Obaa were riven such political powers that
the traditions of the people never recognised. In Oyo for
example, the Oyomesi could no longer check the Alaafin. but
the colonial master that issued orders to him. Though the
people were answerable to the kings in matters relating to
the payment of taxes, the latter was only answerable to the
British overlords about the generated revenue.
In Igboland and other segtnentary societies where there
were no recognised "traditional rulers" other than the
elected elders of the respective villages, "Warrant Chiefs"
v/ere created by the British to perform the type of functions
carried out by the Yoruba Obas and the HBUSB Emirs. The
appointment of these artificial chiefs did not go down well
with these loosely organised people. It was one Of the
factors that led to the Abe women riot of 1929.^ It is
also necessary to note that at this time, the Sarki. Oba
and Warrant Chief made no contribution to decision-making
of their environment. They were rather in office to
implement the policy of the colonial masters. This
completely alienated them from their subjects and the people
began to look unto the colonial administrators as the judi-
cial officers of the last resort to whom their cases could
be brought.
In Kano for example, Dr. Ubah noted that various
complaints were made by members of the commoner class, the
talakavra to the British administrators against the Einirs
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and their officials- Many of such complaints went as far
as the colonial headquarters at Kaduna. These people largely
shifted their confidence to the colonial headquarters at
Kaduna. These people largely shifted their confidence to the
colonial administrators who were also recognised as Zaki
(lions}( to defend them against any abuse of power by the
traditional rulers.
Very vital to the political culture that later emerged
In Nigeria at independence was the protest movements of the
educated commoners in the Mgerian society against the
colonial authority. They argued vehemently about their
ostracization, from the political process and the relative
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excessive use of political powers by meaV-ers ot +.h* •i/*e."litio;..O.
elite. They posited that tne traditional rulers shoulri be
erawenable to the people they ruled and that the masses, much
of which had beer, alienated from the politico] process should
be given better role under the colonial government. For
examplef while comrnentirp on the depressive condition of the
common man. Sir Abubakar Tafav.-a Balewa noted in ]9">0 that:
... in practice their view have never been
sought, their welfare seldom regarded and
their helplessness shockingly abused. And
in the Dative Authority Ordinance they
hardly find a piece, Far from the Chiefs
having v;ell-defined duties, one of the
biggest defeats of the system is the
complete ipnorence of everyone from top to
bottom about hie rights, his obligations
and his powers ... The illiterate ma3B of
the people recognise no change in their
status since the coming of the British.
They are still ruled by might, and
administration is still none of their
concern.33
The protest movemente spearheaded by the educated elitea
(later turned political elites) made the masses of the people
to begin to look unto them for leadership. This gradually
resulted into a further IOSB of influence by members of the
traditional ruling elites who were now viewed as accomplices
of the British administration.
During the nationalist movements however, the bone of
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contention was not on how to ensure the practice of democracy
ir Mgeri& but rather how the political power enjoyed by the
colonial administrators will become transferee! to the emergent
Nigerian ruling el i te . The nationalists, could hereby tie seid
to have understood what democratic government stood, for more
then the change of political mantle, from the colonialists to
Mgerians. The British v/hich never professed to be democratic
during the colonial exploits in Nigeria could not have claimed
during this time to be interested in the development of demo-
crecy in Nigeria. Even if the British colonialists had any
plan of planting the seeds of democracy in Niperiai i t was the
traditional elites rather thanthe political elites who had any
modicum of training for Biich a venture. For most part of the
colonial era, the British administrators distanced themselves
from the educated elites in the country. Yet, these v-ere the
people to whom political power were entrusted at Nigeria's
independence. The traditional rulers who were used by the
British now have no constitutional roles under the Nigerian
system of democratic governance.
The first three political perties that competed for power
in the mid or late forties were more or less ethnic associa-
tions who also found i t necessary to exploit religious diffe-
rences to better their political opportunities. ttach of them
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represented one of the three administrfltive zor.er created
for the convenience or the British in their practice of
Indirect Rule. The psrtie? v/ere the NPC (Northern Peoples'
Conpress) which stood for t"he North» the AO (Action Oroup)
for the '"est, nnd the NCNC (National Council of Niperie end
the Cf>meroons, after 1961. National Council of Nigerian
Citizens) in the East.^ These three politicel narties
prepared the foundation for ethnic politics in Nigeria which
has since been a major bane of the Nigerian democracy. The
"political class" created by the parties s t i l l control politicel
activities in M^eria today the past "effort" of the Babanfida
administration to create "newbreed politicians" notwithstanding.
Professor Dudley considered the three PBrtieB to be products
of coalition of the educated and commercial elites whose sole
objective was to monopolise political power to the disadvantage
of the peasantry and the urban working class*
Most Nigerian politicians heve also found it too difficult
to break awsy from the authoritarian and dictatorial characters
of the pre-colonial and colonial institutions. Moat of their s t i l l
see themselves as "traditional rulers" who should not only be
perpetually left in office but also treated as kabiyegl (we dare
not question him) or Zaki (lion). This they demonstrate In the
use of their political powers. Some of them, most especially
the military class, behave like colonial conquerors. There-
fore* they grossly abuse the fundamental rights of their
subjects and opponents, they falsify election results, engage
in capricious distribution of wealth to their followers etc.
Yet, most of these leaders still describe themselves as
democrats. This is a problem that cut across many African
nations. The so-celled Democrats have always been found to
be enemies,of what they profess. Discussing the general
charecter of such leaders, Arthur Lewis has noted that
Men who claim to be democrats in fact
behave like Bnperors, Personifying
the state, they dresB themselves up in
uniforms> build palaces, bring all other
traffic to a standstill when they drive,
hold fancy parades and generally demand
to be treated like Egyptian Pharaohs.36
The cultural practice in most parts of Nicreria which
makes it an anomaly for one to challenge the elders in the
society has helped to sustain the authoritarian influence of
the political actors in the country. To this end, the youth-
ful politicians wait patiently for the "old breed politicians"
to take their exit from the political scene before making
their own impact felt. The annulment or the June 12, 1993
election by President Ibrahim Babangida has however enlightened
the better that the oppressive class, whether civilian
or military, hsc to be forcefully disloaeed for the er.durinp
democratic p/stem to be instituted ir> Ki"erir..
REFEBCTCB5
1. Abdullah! Smith, 'The ear ly s t a t e s of the Certi
Su<5an', in J . F . Ade Ajayl and K. Crowder,
History of 'I'est Africa. London, Loneroan 3 9"
pp. 163-h; A L i t t l e New Lightt Selected
Hiptoricwl Vri t inps of Abdullah! Smith, Zeria ,
Abduilahi Smith Centre for His to r ica l Research,
3 987, pp. 102-103.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
U. Ibid. -
5. For a detailed discussion of the political power of
the Caliph and the relationship between sokoto
and the emirates read 3a'ad Abubakar, "The
Established Caliphate: Sokoto, the ijnirates and
their Iveighbours" in Obaro Ikime (ed), Ground-
work of Nigerian History. Historical society of
Mgeria/Heinemann, 1980, chap. 17 pp. 303-326.
6. Abdullahi Mahadi, "The Jihad and its role in
strengthening the Saranta (kingship) system In
Hausaland in the nineteenth century. The Case
of Kano", in Ade Ajayi and Baehir Ikara (eds),
Svolution of Political Culture in Mlgeriat
Univ. Press Limited/Kaduna State Council for
Arts and Culture, 1965, P. 125.
7. For details of thia, read William Bascom, Ifa
Divination: Communication between Gods and Men
in"West Africa. Indiana Univ. Press, Bloomington,
8. See R.O. Asabia, "Foundations of YoruliB Government",
Cdu, 7-9, 1959-1963; '.».'. Basoom, 'The 3ociolopical
Hole of the Yoruba Cult Group', Amerlcnn Anthropo-
logis t , Vol. 1+6, 19UI
32
9. I.A. Akinjogbin and E.A. Ayendele» 'Yorutaland up to
1800' in 0, Iklme (e<l), Groundwork of Nigerian
Hlatoryt op. oit., chap. 7, P« 130.
10» Head S.O. Babayemi, The Fall and Rise of O.vo c. 1706-
190*5; A Study In the traditional Culture of an
African Polity. Lagoa. Llchfled Publishers 1990.
11. I.A. Akinjogbin and E.A. Ayandele, 'Yorubaland up to
18001 op. c i t . , p. 131.
12. See S.A. Akintoye, Revolution and Power Pol i t ic a In
Yorubalanri. l8iiO-lB93, Longman, 1971.
1?. I.A. Akinjop-bin and E.A. Ayandele, op. . -It . , p. Ihl.
l)i. J.F. Ade AJayi and S.A. Akintoye, 'Yoru'oal and In the
Nineteenth Century', In 0. Iklme {ed.} Groundwork
of Nigerian Hlatory, op. e l t . , p. JO!. For the
Ibadan example of thia develorment read Toyln
Palolai 'Prom Hoapltallty to Hostility: Ibadan and
Strangers, 183O-19Oli', Journal of African History,
26, 1985, PP. 59-60.
13. Robin Horton, 'Stateless Societies In the History of
Weat Africa'* in Ade Ajayl and M. Croivder (eda),
Hlatory of WeBt Africa. Longman; fi./U Udo,
"Environments and Peoples of hlgorla'1! in 0. Iklme
(edj , Groundwork of hi perl an HIstory, pp. 17-lfl*
16. Robin Horton, "Stateless societ ies In the History of
«e3t Africa", op. c i t . , o* 93; you can also read
Mazl Elechukwu Miako.Igbo Pol i t ical Culture,
Evanston, Horthweatern University Press, 197U.
17. Ibid, pp. 95-97 for a detailed exposition of how the
Secret societ ies functioned in some stateless
soc ie t ies .
16. Thurstan Shaw, "Prehistory", In 0, Iklme (ed.}
Groundwork of Nigerian Hlatory, p. !i5.
33
19. i . J . Alagoa, "lUneteenth Century P o l i t i c a l Culture
in Eastern S ta tes" In Ajayi and Ikara (eds ) ,
evolution of P o l i t i c a l Culture in Mperi a.
20. Michael Crowder, The story of Ijigerlai Faber and
Faber, London, 197S, p . 186; for a recent
detai led study of the Aro Oligarchy read K.O.
i and Fel ic ia iJcejiuba, The Aro of South
Nip-erie 1650-1960. A Study of Socio-
Formation and Transformation in
Ibadan, Univ. Press Ltd! 1990.
21. Cited by J . 5 . Trimingham, Islam in WeBt Africa,
Oxford Univ. P res s , London, 1966, p . 111.
22. J.A. At-anda, '•ColliEion and Coalition in the
p o l i t i c s and society of western Nigeria in the
Nineteenth Century", in J . P . Ade AJeyi and B.
Ikara (eda) , Evolution of Po l l t i ca ] Culture in
Mger ia . p . 8~El
23. For the d e t a i l s , see JPS . .Bos ton , The Itrala Kingdom,
Ibedan, Oxford Univ. Press 19&S^
2k. J.A. Atando, op. c i t . , p . 88.
2s!. Chief Qliaf?nii Awolgw<j, The Probleroa of Africa: The
Meerl for Ideological Reappraisal. London,
Loncrman 1975, p . 15.
26. K. Cromder, The Story of Mi^eria, Paber and Paber,
London, 1966, p . 227.
27. Ib id , p. 226.
28. Ibid , pp. 2Ui4-2U5-
29. B.J. Dudley, I n s t a b i l i t y and P o l i t i c a l Order:
Po l i t i c s and Cr i s i s in Nigeria. Itsadan Univ.
Press, 1973. P. 25.
30. M. Crowder, op. c i t . , p . 225.
31. See Nina b. Mba, Nigerian women Mobilized; Women's
P o l i t i c a l Activity in Southern Hiperla, 1900-1965,
Berkeley, 1982, pp. 7b-oe.
% •
32. C.N. Uboh, "Continuity and Change in the
administration of the Nigerian emirr+es: The
Kano example, 1900-1960"', in AJB"/i nni Iksre
( eds), Evolution of Politic?"* Culture , pp.
3 32-3.
33. C.S. '.'."hitalter, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity
in Northern KlreriB l<»;f—iqftf
Princeton, 19X), Tvp.97.qfl.
3(1. For detailed hi stories1 info^mntlon about thepp Tinrt
see R.L. Sklar, Wl?erla Political PartleB. (New
Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press,
35. B.J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order, op, clt.,
P. 33.
36. vf. Arthur Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship: The Crisis
ol' the One-Party State", Encounter, Vol. 25, fto. 2,
1965, p. 3«
